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Abstract
Face presentation attacks have become a major threat to face recognition systems and
many countermeasures have been proposed in the past decade. However, most of them
are devoted to 2D face presentation attacks, rather than 3D face masks. Unlike the real
face, the 3D face mask is usually made of resin materials and has a smooth surface,
resulting in reflectance differences. So, we propose a novel detection method for 3D
face mask presentation attack by modeling reflectance differences based on intrinsic
image analysis. In the proposed method, the face image is first processed with intrinsic
image decomposition to compute its reflectance image. Then, the intensity distribu-
tion histograms are extracted from three orthogonal planes to represent the intensity
differences of reflectance images between the real face and 3D face mask. After that,
the 1D convolutional network is further used to capture the information for describing
different materials or surfaces react differently to changes in illumination. Extensive
experiments on the 3DMAD database demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
method in distinguishing a face mask from the real one and show that the detection
performance outperforms other state-of-the-art methods.
Keywords: 3D face PAD, Intrinsic Image Analysis, Deep Learning
1. Introduction
Face presentation attack detection (PAD) has become an important issue in face
recognition, since the biometric technologies have been applied in various verification
systems and mobile devices. For instance, Apple’s face ID for iPhone X has been
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used to unlock cell phones and complete mobile payments. However, D. Oberhaus [1]
reported that some researchers at the Vietnamese cybersecurity firm Bkav had made a
mask that could fool the Face ID system. Considering such urgent security situation,
an effective and reliable 3D face mask PAD method must be developed.
Based on different presented fake faces, four kinds of presentation attacks can be
considered: printed photo, displayed image, replayed video and 3D mask. The printed
photo, displayed image and replayed video attacks usually print or display a face im-
age in 2D medium (e.g., paper and LCD screen). But for 3D face mask scenario, the
attacker wears a 3D mask to deceive face recognition system. Compared to 2D face
presentation attacks, 3D face masks contain the structural and depth information simi-
lar to real faces. Fig. 1 shows an example of different face presentation attacks.
In the last decade, many face PAD approaches have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. However, the main focus of them has been on tackling the
problem of 2D face presentation attacks, while 3D attacks have received much less
attention. It is because detecting 3D face masks and distinguish them from real faces
more challenging for common cameras. For instance, Liu et al. [14] estimated face
depth by a CNN-RNN model and used the depth information to detect presented fake
faces. This method can solve the 2D face PAD successfully. Whereas, this detection
method cannot work well in a 3D mask attack as the mask also has depth information.
In another work, Li et al. [15] tackled the 3D mask attacks by detecting the pulse from
videos, which may be sensitive to camera settings and light conditions. Besides, it
becomes easier to obtain 3D masks by attackers with the development of 3D printing.
Thus, it is necessary to develop new methods for detecting 3D face mask.
In this work, we propose to analyze the intrinsic image for 3D face mask PAD.
Intrinsic image decomposition can divide a single image into a reflectance image and a
shading image [16]. For the reflectance image, it gives the albedo at each point, which
describes the reflectance characteristics and is only decided by the material itself. In
contrast, the shading image gives the total light flux incident at each point. Comparing
the real face with face mask, we can find that their constituted materials are fairly
different. Furthermore, due to the influence of hair follicles, the surface of 3D face
mask is smoother than the surface of real face. More specifically, the face skin consists
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濉Figure 1: Samples of face presentation attacks. From left to right: printed face photos, displayed face images
or replayed videos, and 3D masks.
describes the reflectance characteristics and is only decided by the material itself. In
contrast, the shading image gives the total light flux incident at each point. Comparing
the real face with face mask, we can find that their constituted materials are fairly
different. Furthermore, due to the influence of hair follicles, the surface of 3D face
mask is smoother than the surface of real face. More specifically, the face skin consists35
of three layers: epidermis, dermis and subcutaneous fat 1 as illustrated in Fig. 2 (left).
But for the 3D face mask, it is often made of resin materials as shown in Fig. 2 (right).
These material or surface differences can be revealed in reflectance images and further
used for analyzing visual difference.
Our proposed method can be divided into three procedures: (i) the captured face40
image is first decomposed into a reflectance image and a shading image based on
correlation-based intrinsic image extraction (CIIE) [17]; (ii) the intensity distribution
histograms of reflectance images are calculated from three orthogonal planes and the
1D convolutional neural network (CNN) is introduced to extract the differences in re-
flectance images; (iii) the extracted features are fed into a Support Vector Machine45
(SVM) classifier to detect 3D face mask attack. The main contributions of this work
1https://www.webmd.com/skin-problems-and-treatments/ss/slideshow-skin-infections
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Face MaskReal Face 
Figure 2: The difference between real face (left) and face mask (right) in skin material. For the real face
skin, it consists of three layers: epidermis, dermis and subcutaneous fat. But for the face mask, it is often
made of resin materials.
are summarized:
⋄ Unlike most previous works on 3D face mask PAD are based on analyzing visible
cues (e.g. texture) directly, we propose a novel and appealing countermeasure from the
view of intrinsic image decomposition.50
⋄ We design an intensity distribution feature for describing the difference of re-
flectance images between the real face and 3D face mask and introduce 1D CNN to
represent different materials or surfaces react differently to the changes in variational
illumination.
⋄ We evaluate the proposed method on 3DMAD dataset and achieve the state-of-55
the-art performance.
2. Related Work
2.1. Methods for 2D Face PAD
Texture-analysis based methods. Due to the limitations of printers and display de-
vices, the printed or replayed fake faces generally present blurred textures compared to60
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2. Relate Work
2.1. Methods for 2D Face PAD
Texture-analysis based methods. Due to the limitations of printers and display de-
vices, the printed or replayed fake faces generally present blurred textures compared to
the real ones. Thus, using texture information has been a natural approach to tackling
2D face presentation attack. For instance, many works employed hand-crafted features,
such as local binary pattern (LBP) [4], Haralick features [18] and scale-invariant feature
transform (SIFT) [19], and then used traditional classifiers, such as SVM and LDA. To
capture the color differences in chrominance, the texture features extracted from differ-
ent color spaces (e.g. RGB, HSV and YCbCr) are also been analyzed [20]. Apart from
that, some feature descriptors or indexes are computed to describe the clarity of facial
texture [9, 8, 21]. More recently, many attempts of using CNN-based features in face
PAD [22, 23, 24]. While these methods are effective to typical 2D paper or replayed
attacks, they become vulnerable when attackers wear a lifelike face mask.
Motion-analysis based methods. Apart from analyzing the texture differences, mo-
tion is another important clue for printed photo and displayed image attacks. The most
commonly used solutions are based on detecting aliveness signals, such as eye blinking
[6, 25], head motion [26], facial muscle twitching [27] and pulse [14]. Besides, there
are methods relying on the planar object movements [7] and the optical flow fields [28].
Moreover, in order to capture the temporal texture variations from a video sequence as
[29], the deep networks with timing processing such as long short memory network
(LSTM) and 3D CNN are used to detect face presentation attack [30, 31]. These algo-
rithms make it easy to detect the printed or displayed image attack. But when facing
with 3D face mask attack with eye/mouth portion being cut, their performance will be
greatly discounted.
Hardware based methods. In recent years, various hardwares have been applied for
the task of face PAD. For instance, the Kinect camera was used to capture depth infor-
mation and detect fake faces [3]. The reason is that there is no any depth information
in 2D presentation attacks. Also, the near-infrared (NIR) sensors and photodiodes are
explored to enhance the optical difference between the real and fake faces [11, 12].
More recently, light-field cameras allow exploiting disparity and depth information
from a single capture. Therefore, some works introduced these kinds of cameras into
face PAD [32, 33, 34]. Even though those hardware-based methods can achieve good
performances for 2D face PAD, some of them might present operation restrictions in
certain conditions. For instance, the sunlight can cause severe perturbations for NIR
and depth sensors; wearable 3D masks are obviously challenging for those methods
relying on depth data.
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2.2. Methods for 3D Face Mask PAD
3D face mask presentation attack is a new threat to face biometric systems and few
countermeasures have been proposed compared to conventional 2D attacks. To address
this issue, Erdogmus et al. [35] released the first 3D mask attack dataset (3DMAD).
Different from printed or replayed fake faces, the attackers in 3DMAD wear 3D face
masks of targeted persons. Inspired by [4], Erdogmus et al. utilized multi-scale LBP
based texture representation for 3D face mask PAD. In addition, Liu et al. [36] pre-
sented an rPPG-based method to cope with 3D mask attacks. In another work, Li et al.
[15] tackled the 3D mask attacks based on pulse detection. These two methods mainly
analyze the different heartbeat signals between real faces and 3D masks. However,
they may be sensitive to camera settings and light conditions. More recently, Shao et
al. [37] extracted optical flow features from a pre-trained VGG-net [38] to estimate
subtle motion.
3. Proposed Method
3.1. Rationale and Motivations
As aforementioned, the constituted materials of real face and 3D face mask are
different and these differences can be revealed in reflectance images, which are shown
in Fig. 3(a) and 3(b). From the example, it can be found that the reflectance images of
real face have low intensity and uniform distribution while the reflectance images of 3D
face mask have high intensity and non-uniform distribution. Based on this observation,
we propose a new method to discriminate the reflectance difference of real faces and
3D face masks.
In reflectance images of real and spoofing faces, reflectance images often present
obvious intensity difference due to different materials and surface structures. To de-
scribe the intensity differences, we extract intensity histograms from the view of albedo
intensity. Furthermore, the skin surface of the real face is rougher than the 3D face
mask, which is caused by hair follicles, etc. When lighting changes or the face shake,
the reflectance images of real face and 3D face mask also show different responses.
For instance, the reflectance image of a smooth surface is more sensitive to lighting
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(a) Real face (b) 3D face mask
Figure 3: The hot figures of the reflectance image sequences of real face (left) and 3D face mask (right).
mask, which is caused by hair follicles, etc. When lighting changes or the face shake,120
the reflectance images of real face and 3D face mask also show different responses.
For instance, the reflectance image of a smooth surface is more sensitive to lighting
changes. So in addition to extracting the intensity histogram, we further use a 1D CNN
to extract the difference in illumination sensitivity of the reflectance image.
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Figure 4: The flowchart of our proposed 3D face mask PADmethod. It consists of four modules: Reflectance
Extraction, Intensity Histograms, 1D CNNs and SVM classification. In the second module, XY, XT and YT
maps are calculated from three orthogonal planes of different color channels (denoted as c1, c2 and c3). In
1D CNNs module, the channel number of convolutional feature maps is 64 and the dimension of the last
layer is 768× 1.
Therefore, as shown in Fig. 4, our proposed approach is divided into four modules,125
i.e., Reflectance Extraction, Intensity Histograms, 1D CNNs and SVM classification.
First, the frames of captured face video are decomposed into reflectance images and
shading images. Then, the intensity histograms of reflectance images are calculated
7
(a) Real face
(a) Real face (b) 3D face mask
Figure 3: The hot figures of the refl ctance image sequences of real face (left) and 3D face mask (right).
mask, which is caused by hair follicles, etc. When lighting changes or the face shake,120
the reflectan e images of real face nd 3D face mask lso sh w different responses.
For insta ce, th reflectan e image of a smooth surface is more sensitive to light ng
changes. So in addition o extracting the int nsity histogram, we furthe use a 1D CNN
to extract the difference in illumination se sitivity of the reflectan e image.
濄濉
Reflectance Extraction
75 75
Video Frames Reflectance
Intensity Histograms
XY 
map
XT 
map
YT
map
C
o
n
v
R
e
L
U
P
o
o
lin
g
濷
C
o
n
v
R
e
L
U
P
o
o
lin
g
濷
C
o
n
v
R
e
L
U
P
o
o
lin
g
濷
1D CNNs 
᷌
漖
SVM Classification
Real
Fake
Texture Segment
c1 c2 3 Concatenate64 6464
Color Space Block1 Block2 l 3 Block6
768灤1
768灤1
768灤1
Figure 4: The flowchart of our proposed 3D face mask PADmethod. It consists of four modules: R flectance
Extraction, Intensity Histograms, 1D CNNs and SVM classification. In the second mo ule, XY, T and YT
maps are calculated from three orthogonal planes of different color channels (denoted as c1, c2 and c3). In
1D CNNs module, the channel umber of convolutional feature maps is 64 and the dimension of the last
layer is 768× 1.
Therefor , as shown in Fig. 4, our proposed approach is divi ed into four modules,125
i.e., Reflectan e Extraction, Intensity Histograms, 1D CNNs and SVM classification.
First, the frames of captured face video are decomp sed into reflectance images and
shading images. Then, the intensity histograms of reflectance images are calculated
7
(b) 3D face mask
Figure 3: The hot figures of the reflectance image sequences of real face (left) and 3D face mask (right).
changes. So in addition to extracting the intensity histogram, we further use a 1D CNN
to extract the difference in illumination sensitivity of the reflectance image.
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Therefore, as shown in Fig. 4, our proposed approach is divided into four modules,125
i.e., Reflectance Extraction, Intensity Histograms, 1D CNNs and SVM classification.
First, the frames of captured face video are decomposed into reflectance images and
shading imag s. Th n, the intensity hist grams of refl ctance imag s ar calculated
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from three orthogonal planes (TOP) and combined into three histogram feature maps,
which can describe the ratio and distribution of different intensities. After that, these
TOP histogram feature maps are fed into three 1D CNNs to extract the difference in
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illumination sensitivity, respectively. Finally, an SVM classifier is employed to distin-
guish whether the concatenated deep features are oriented from a valid access or a 3D
face mask.
3.2. Intrinsic Image Decomposition
Based on the Lambertian theory [16], the intensity value I(x, y) of every pixel in
an image is the product of the shading S(x, y) and the reflectanceR(x, y) at that point:
I(x, y) = S(x, y) × R(x, y). The shading S(x, y) represents illumination changes
and is decided by external light intensity. R(x, y) gives the albedo at each point. In
addition, albedo completely describes the reflectance characteristics for Lambertian
(perfectly diffusing) surfaces. Considering different materials of real face and 3D face
mask, we will analyze the reflectance images of them. In the context, we utilize the
CIIE algorithm [17] to decompose the original face image.
More specifically, the steerable filters are first used to decompose the face image
into its constituent orientation/frequency bands. Then, the filter bank is applied to es-
timate the luminance components (LMij) and the variations in local amplitude (AM ),
texture (TM ), and hue (HM ), respectively. Based on this assumption that luminance
variations are either due to reflectance or illumination but not both, the estimated shad-
ing and reflectance can be reconstructed as follows:
S = FS ⊗
 Crec shdij × LMij ifCrec shdij > 00 ifCrec shdij ≤ 0 (1)
R = FS ⊗
 C
rec ref
ij × LMij ifCrec refij > 0
0 ifCrec refij ≤ 0
(2)
where ij is the index of LM and ⊗ is the reconstruction of steerable filters FS with
weighted LMij . Crec shdij and C
rec ref
ij are correlation coefficients for reconstructed
shading and reflectance, respectively.
During image reconstruction, some LM components will be set to zero and re-
sulting images may lose their DC values. Meanwhile, some AM components will
represent small variations in reflectance not shading. Thus two cost functions are used
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to optimize S and R, as illustrated in Eq. 3 and Eq. 4.
ES(VDC) = argminTi
∑
i
Ftxt(
I
S + VDC
, Ti) (3)
ER = argmink
∑
i
Ftxt( ˆLM ij , Tk) + λEcst(Fadj) (4)
where VDC is the DC value to be optimized. The function Ftxt(Iˆ , Ti) represents texture
consistency evaluated for image Iˆ against the texture segmentation result. ˆLM ij is
modelled as a normal distribution and Ecst(Fadj) constrains the maximum rescaling
produced by the adjustment function. Fig. 3 shows the reflectance image sequences of
a real face and a 3D face mask.
Table 1: The configuration parameters in 1D CNN. aPool is the operation of average pooling and Trans is
the operation of matrix transpose.
layer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
type Conv ReLU aPool Conv ReLU aPool Conv ReLU aPool Conv ReLU
filt size [3, 1] − − [3, 1] − − [3, 1] − − [3, 1] −
filt dim 1 − − 64 − − 64 − − 64 −
num filts 64 − − 64 − − 64 − − 64 −
stride 1 1 [2, 1] 1 1 [2, 1] 1 1 [2, 1] 1 1
pad [1, 0] 0 0 [1, 0] 0 0 [1, 0] 0 0 [1, 0] 0
layer 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
type aPool Conv ReLU aPool Conv ReLU Conv Trans FC SoftMax −
filt size − [3, 1] − − [2, 1] − [1, 1] − [1, 1] − −
filt dim − 64 − − 64 − 64 − 64 − −
num filts − 64 − − 64 − 64 − 2 − −
stride [2, 1] 1 1 [2, 1] 1 1 1 1 1 1 −
pad 0 [1, 0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −
3.3. Intensity Histograms
In order to represent different intensities and distributions of reflectance images,
we extract the intensity histograms from three orthogonal planes (i.e., XY, XT and YT)
as shown in Fig. 5, where T represents the time dimension.
Considering the three orthogonal planes, the reflectance image sequence can be
denoted as R = {R1, R2, ..., Ri, ...Rn}, where Ri denotes the ith reflectance image
9
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Figure 5: Extract intensity histograms from three orthogonal planes.
Considering the three orthogonal planes, the reflectance image sequence can be
denoted as R = {R1, R2, ..., Ri, ...Rn}, where Ri denotes the ith reflectance image
in R and n is the length of the sequence. In our algorithm, we set n = 75, which170
can capture intensity variations [20]. Before extracting intensity histograms, the size
of color reflectance images is first empirically normalized to 150 × 150. For the XY
plane, intensity histogram from the color channels of each reflectance image of R is
extracted and combined into a matrix, which is illustrated in Eq.5.
HXY =

h(Rc11 ), h(R
c2
1 ), h(R
c3
1 )
h(Rc12 ), h(R
c2
2 ), h(R
c3
2 )
..., ..., ...
h(Rc1n ), h(R
c2
n ), h(R
c3
n )
 (5)
where c1, c2 and c3 represent different color channels. h(·) means the operation of175
intensity histogram extraction and the dimension of HXY is 75× 768.
However, on XT and YT planes, we extract a slice of R every other row or column
and count its intensity histograms also from different color channels. The reflectance
image sequences from XT and YT can be written as X = {X1, X2, ..., Xi, ...Xn˙} and
Y = {Y1, Y2, ..., Yi, ...Yn¨}, respectively. n˙ and n¨ are the sequence length and equal to180
n. Finally, the XT and YT intensity histogram matrices with the size of 75 × 768 are
obtained based on Eq. 6 and Eq. 7.
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HXT =

h(Xc11 ), h(X
c2
1 ), h(X
c3
1 )
h(Xc12 ), h(X
c2
2 ), h(X
c3
2 )
..., ..., ...
h(Xc1n˙ ), h(X
c2
n˙ ), h(X
c3
n˙ )
 (6)
HY T =

h(Y c11 ), h(Y
c2
1 ), h(Y
c3
1 )
h(Y c12 ), h(Y
c2
2 ), h(Y
c3
2 )
..., ..., ...
h(Y c1n¨ ), h(Y
c2
n¨ ), h(Y
c3
n¨ )
 (7)
3.4. 1D CNNs
Different materials and surfaces react differently to illumination changes. There-
fore, apart from intensity location features, we also use 1D CNN to extract intensity
variation information from HXY , HXT and HY T . As shown in Fig. 4, the 1D CNNs
module presents three parallel 1D CNNs. In each network, 1D operation is employed
to extract intensity variation information. Compared to other deep networks [22, 39],
the solution differs mainly in three aspects: (i) 1D convolutional filters are adopted to
extract the temporal information of neighboring histograms; (ii) 1D pooling layers can
effectively reduce the dimension after convolutional layers; (iii) The output features do
not fuse the information between different intensity values.
The parameters of 1D CNN network are summarized in Table 1. For all convo-
lutional layers except the 16th layer, the size of convolutional filters is set to 3 × 1.
This means the convolutional filter can extract the intensity variation in three adjacent
histograms and reduce network parameters as [40]. After each convolutional layer, we
use Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) to activate the convolutional outputs [41]. Then
the pooling layers with size of 2 × 1 are utilized to gradually down-sample the results
from ReLU layer. In the last pooling layer, the dimension of outputs is 1×768. Before
feeding the outputs of last pooling layer into a fully connected (FC) layer, we introduce
a transposition layer to reshape the size of outputs into 768× 1.
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(a) Real face: XY histogram matrix
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Figure 6: The input and output of 1D CNN network. (a) and (b) are the results of a real face reflectance
image sequence, and (c) and (d) are the results of a 3D face mask reflectance image sequence. To make the
histogram matrix better visualized, we use jet colormap in (a) and (c). (b) and (d) plot the area of the output
of 1D CNNs.
For face PAD, its essence is to classify whether the input is a real face or a pre-
sented 3D face mask. Thus, after FC layer, the most commonly used SoftMax loss
function is employed to train the network parameters [42]. In testing stage, we extract
the outputs of the last Conv layer as the finally features of HXY , HXT and HY T de-205
noted as CXY , CXT and CY T . Fig. 6 shows the intensity histogram matrixes and the
learned intensity variation features of the reflectance image sequences of the real face
and the 3D face mask in XY plane of RGB color space. After feature extraction, we
concatenate CXY , CXT and CY T into a feature vector with stronger representation,
which are fed into an SVM classifier.210
In training stage, the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm [43] is used to
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In training stage, the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm [43] is used to
learn the network parameters. The learning rate is set to 10−3. The momentum is set
to 0.9 and weight decay 0.0005. In addition, we realize the 1D CNNs and SVM based
on MatConvNet with the version 1.0-beta20 2 and liblinear with the version 1.96 3,
respectively.
4. Experimental Setup
4.1. Experimental Data
3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD). 3DMAD 4 [35] is the first public-available
database for 3D face mask PAD with 3D face masks from Thatsmyface5. The database
consists of 17 subjects, 3 sessions and total 255 video clips (76500 frames). Each
subject has 15 videos with 10 real faces and 5 face masks. Videos are captured through
Kinect sensors and are equipped with color and depth maps in 640 × 480 resolution.
Fig. 7 shows some color examples of real face and 3D face mask.
.
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濄濇Figure 7: Samples from 3DMAD database. From left column to right column: real faces, real faces and 3D
face mask.
HKBU-MARs V1. HKBU-MARs V1 6 [36] is a supplementary database for 3D face
2http://www.vlfeat.org/matconvnet/
3https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/∼cjlin/liblinear/
4https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/3dmad
5www.thatsmyface.com
6http://rds.comp.hkbu.edu.hk/mars/
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HKBU-MARs V1. HKBU-MARs V1 6 [36] is a supplementary database for 3D face
mask PAD. It contains 120 videos from 8 subjects and masks. Two types of 3D masks
are included: 6 from Thatsmyface and 2 from REAL-F 7. Each subject corresponds to
10 genuine samples and 5 masked samples. All videos are recorded through Logeitech
C920 web-camera in 1280 × 720 resolution under room lighting condition. Fig. 8
shows some color examples of real face and 3D face mask.
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Figure 8: Samples from HKBU-MARs V1 database. From left column to right column: real faces, real faces
and 3D face mask. For the mask, the first row represents the mask generated from Thatsmyface and the
second row represents the mask generated from REAL-F.
Table 2: The 3DMAD detection results of different plane combination mechanisms.
Combined Planes
Dev Set Test Set
EER(%) AUC(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) EER(%) AUC(%)
XY 2.2 99.74 2.8 5.0 3.9 0.0 100
XT 0.5 99.95 3.9 1.2 2.6 0.0 100
YT 0.4 99.98 2.4 2.5 2.4 0.0 100
XY-XT 0.8 99.94 2.7 2.8 2.7 0.0 100
XY-YT 0.1 100 1.2 3.2 2.2 0.0 100
XT-YT 0.0 100 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 100
XY-XT-YT 0.0 100 0.2 1.2 0.7 0.0 100
4.2. Evaluation Protocol230
For training and testing, we use the leave-one-out cross-validation (LOOCV) mech-
anism as used in paper [35]. For 3DMAD database, one subject’s data is left for testing
while the data of the remaining 16 subjects is divided into two subject-disjoint halves
7http://real-f.jp/en the-realface.html
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while the data of the remaining 16 subjects is divided into two subject-disjoint halves
as training and development sets in each fold of cross validations. However, for KBU-
MARs V1 database, we only use this database for inter-test as one person’s video data
is not published.
With performance evaluation, the results are reported in term of recently stan-
dardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [44]: Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate
(APCER) and Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER). It is noted
that the APCER and BPCER depend on the decision threshold estimated by Equal Er-
ror Rate (EER) on the development set. To compare the overall system performance
in a single value, the Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) is computed, which is
the average of the APCER and the BPCER [45]. To compare with existing works, we
also report the results of EER and Area Under Curve (AUC) on the test set.
5. Experimental Results and Discussion
In this part, the intensity histograms of different planes are firstly evaluated on the
detection performance. Then, various color spaces are analyzed for 3D face mask PAD.
Furthermore, we extract the intensity histograms from original face images and com-
pare the detection results with intrinsic images. After that, the inter-test experiments
are performed on HKBU-MARs V1 database. Finally, the performance of our method
is compared against the state-of-the-art approaches.
Table 3: The 3DMAD detection results of different color spaces.
Color Space
Dev Set Test Set
EER(%) AUC(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) EER(%) AUC(%)
RGB 9.9 96.55 5.3 12.3 8.8 3.2 98.53
YCbCr 0.5 99.97 0.8 1.3 1.0 0.0 100
HSV 0.0 100 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 100
5.1. Three Orthogonal Planes
Table 2 illustrates the results of the intensity histograms extracted from different
planes and combined using different mechanisms. From the table, we can clearly find
that all averaged EERs and all averaged AUCs of test sets are 0.0% and 100%. This
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means that our proposed method can accurately distinguish between real faces and 3D
masks by the decision threshold determined by the data set itself. However, when the
test set uses the threshold of the development set, the detection performance of the
algorithm in the test set will decrease. In addition, for combining different intensity
histograms, it is shown that simultaneously concatenating TOP histograms will not
improve the detection accuracy. We conjecture that the reason may lie in that the
feature dimension is too high for the classifier to overfit. Rather, when cascading the
intensity histograms extracted from XT and YT planes, our algorithm achieve the best
results with APCER=0.1%, BPCER=0.8% and ACER=0.4%. This reflects the fact that
3D face masks are more sensitive to the changes in lighting than real face skin. Fig. 9
shows the detailed classification of the best case in LOOCV mechanism. For instance,
there are some classification failures in the samples of the 2nd and 7th subjects.
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Figure 9: The APCER, BPCER and ACER of each subject in 3DMAD. The horizontal axis represents the
subject’s ID.
Table 4: Compare our proposed method with original face images.
Face Image
Dev Set Test Set
EER(%) AUC(%) APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) EER(%) AUC(%)
Original Face 0.7 99.98 1.6 0.6 1.1 0.0 100
Intrinsic Face 0.0 100 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 100
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Face I age
ev et est Set
( ) ( ) P ( ) P ( ) ER( ) EER( ) AUC(%)
riginal Face 0.7 99.98 1.6 0.6 1.1 0.0 100
Intrinsic Face 0.0 100 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.0 100
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Table 5: The detection results of inter-test.
Face Mask
Trained on 3DMAD Test on HKBU
APCER(%) BPCER(%) ACER(%) EER(%) AUC(%)
Thatsmyface 100 0 50 57.2 49.99
REAL-F 100 0 50 89.8 4.4
5.2. Different Color Spaces
Furthermore, we extract the histograms from different color spaces (i.e. RGB,
YCbCr and HSV), and compare the detection results in Table 3. The table shows
that the color is a very important clue for 3D face mask PAD. Compared to the RGB
color space, the YCbCr and HSV display color and brightness in different channels.
For instance, the HSV shows the brightness information in H channel and the color
information in S and V channels. When the intensity histograms are extracted from the
color channel and brightness channel respectively, the detection performance of our
algorithm can be significantly improved. It can be observed in Table 3 that the ACER
of HSV is 22 times lower than the ACER of the RGB color space.
5.3. Comparison with Original Face Image
In order to verify the validity of the proposed intrinsic image analysis, we extract
the intensity histograms from original face images in HSV color space and calculate
the intensity variational information also using 1D CNN. The comparison results are
shown in Table 4. When extracting the intensity histograms from original face images,
the EER of dev set and ACER of test set are 0.7% and 1.1%, respectively. Compared
the results of our proposed intrinsic image analysis based method, the ACER is reduced
by nearly three times. This shows that it is reasonable and effective to detect 3D face
mask in intrinsic image space.
5.4. Cross Database Evaluation
To gain insight into the generalization capabilities of our proposed detection method,
we conduct a cross-database evaluation. To be more specific, the countermeasure is
trained and tuned on 3DMAD and then tested on HKBU-MARs V1 database. The ob-
tained detection results are summarized in Table 5. During the experiment, the first 9
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subjects in 3DMAD are used to train our algorithm, and the remaining 8 subjects are
used as the development set. When classifying according to the threshold of 3DMAD
database, all 3D face masks are detected incorrectly with APCER=100% and all real
faces are correctly classified with BPCER=0%. The reason may lie in that the materials
of face mask of these two databases are different. From these results, we conclude that
our proposed method is only for detecting the 3D face masks with specific material.
Table 6: Comparison between our proposed countermeasure and state-of-the-art methods on 3DMAD
database.
Methods
Test Set
ACER(%) EER(%) AUC(%)
MS-LBP [35]† - 5.2 98.65
fc-CNN [25]† - 3.2 98.36
LBP-TOP [29]† - 1.4 99.92
rPPG[36]† - 8.6 96.81
DCCTL [37] - 0.6 99.99
Pulse [15] 7.9 4.7 -
Our Method 0.4 0.0 100
† the results are reported in [37].
5.5. Comparison with the State of the Art
Table 6 gives a comparison with the state-of-the-art in 3D face mask PAD tech-
niques proposed in the literature. It can be seen that our proposed intrinsic image
analysis based method outperforms the-state-of-the-art algorithms on the EERs of de-
velopment set test set. Especially compared with the pulse detection based algorithms
[36, 15], the ACER of our proposed method is 0.4%, which is nearly 20 times better
than the ACER obtained by [15]. As aforementioned, the reason may lie in the pulse
detection based methods are sensitive to camera settings and light conditions. For LBP-
TOP [29] and DCCTL [37], their EERs are 1.4% and 0.6%, respectively. Even though
the performances are better than pulse detection based methods, they can be interfered
by the attacker’s head shake. Unfortunately, for 3D face mask PAD, there is only one
fully public database (i.e. 3DMAD) so far, which makes it difficult to fully verify the
effectiveness of our algorithm.
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6. Conclusion
In this article, we addressed the problem of 3D face mask PAD from the viewpoint
of intrinsic image analysis. We designed a new feature for reflectance characteristic
description. Apart from that, we also introduced 1D CNN to extract intensity varia-
tion features. Extensive experiments on 3DMAD database showed excellent results.
However, deep features extracted from three orthogonal planes should have different
weights, but in our approach we simply concatenate them together. Therefore, we will
design a attention model to tackle this problem. For the generalization capability, we
think developing a 3D face mask PAD method with interoperability is big open issue,
which is far from the current state of the art. So we leave it to future work.
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